In this paper, we consider security-privacy issues in authentication techniques based on the extraction of common randomness. We demonstrate that the key rate-privacy leak pairs can be enhanced using reliable components extraction from specially designed random projections. The decrease of bit error probability is estimated and its impact on the key rate and privacy leak is evaluated. Several authentication schemes with new helper data protocol are proposed.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the authentication of humans and physical objects based on biometrics and physically unclonable functions (PUFs) underwent a considerable evolution enabling to introduce crypto-based security into the analog noisy world [1] . These new techniques are able to overcome the fundamental sensitivity issue of classical cryptographic encryption and one-way functions to small noise in input data by trade-offing the security and robustness to noise. The inherent feature of practically all state-of-the-art authentication protocols robust to noise is the storage of some additional information (a.k.a. helper data) assisting in the reliable extraction of a common secret at the enrollment (encoder) and authentication (decoder) sides [1, 2, 3] . At the same time, since the helper data is somehow input dependent, it raises natural concerns that it should provide little information about the secret extracted from the noisy data (secrecy leak) and input itself (privacy leak). The secrecy leak needs to be small to prevent system abuse by the impersonation attack, when the attacker tries to construct artificial biometrics or PUFs that can pass the authentication based on the disclosed templates. A small privacy leak is required to protect some sensitive information that can be extracted from the inputs. The schematic diagram of helper data based authentication is shown in Fig. 1 . The main idea behind this kind of authentication is based on the Wyner-Ziv binning principle used for source coding with side
The contact author is S. Voloshynovskiy (email: svolos@unige.ch). http://sip.unige.ch. This work is supported by SNF projects 111643 and 1119770 $ECODER information [4] , when a compressed version U of input data X is constructed and the key S and helper data M are generated as functions of U. Roughly 2 NI(U ;X) U sequences are generated and randomly distributed into approximately 2 N (I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y )) bins, each containing about 2 NI(U ;Y ) sequences. The bin index M serves as the helper data and the sequence index S within the bin is the key. The secure sketch approach [3] and Slepian-Wolf based authentication using syndrome coding [2] are exactly based on this architecture. The authentication layer is based on the classical cryptographic authentication as for the noiseless digital inputs. At the same time, the authentication system should satisfy: reliability:
key rate:
secrecy leak:
with small nonnegative . The secrecy leak I(S; M ) can be made arbitrary small by proper randomization and one can control the trade-off between the privacy leak L p and key rate R s by the different choices of U. It was demonstrated that this trade-off can be [5, 6] :
The key rate can be maximized by setting U = X that yields: Such a selection of a compressed version U mimics the Slepian-Wolf lossless distributed source coding of discrete sources used in [2] . For the i.i.d. Gaussian setup with Y = X + Z and X ∼ N (0, σ
where
is the squared correlation coefficient between X and Y and σ
If the above setup is converted into binary form based on binary quantization, one obtains the Slepian-Wolf scheme with:
that is the binary entropy; and for the equilikely bits H(B x ) = 1 and the bit error probabilityP b (cross-over probability for Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) linking B x and B y ) is found as:
Therefore, the key rate-privacy leak pair is completely defined byP b that in turn is defined by ρ 2 XY . Tuyls et. al. considered two practical setups based on the above theoretical framework of helper data assisted authentication [7] . The first setup is based on the secret extraction from significant components [8] and the second one is based on the secret extraction from binarized data considered above using error-correction codes (ECC). The main idea behind the first setup is to apply the Fisher discriminative transform to the input data and to extract the most reliable components possessing a magnitude higher then a certain threshold. Thus, the helper data M is used to communicate the information about these components to the decoder. The scheme is 0-secrecy leaking, i.e., I(S; M ) = 0, ans its robustness in terms ofP b was upper bounded according to Bernstein's inequality. The privacy of this scheme was not theoretically analyzed. The second setup is based on the ECC implementation, where it was also shown that I(S; M ) = 0 and the key rate-privacy leak pair coincides with (11)-(12). The rate of ECC is proportional to H 2 (P b ) that should ensure reliable key retrieval at the decoder side.
Both techniques are facing several deficiencies that we will address in this paper. In the first case, the application of Fisher transform requires knowledge of the input data and noise statistics in terms of their covariance matrices to perform the diagonalization. It can be estimated off-line but it still requires a quite significant amount of training data. Such a transform is data-dependent and the addition of new entries might also request the re-training that does not ensure backward compatibility. Moreover, the independence and Gaussianity of the transformed coefficients are desirable. Additionally, the extraction of significant components based on the absolute value thresholding leads to a variable template length. This requires an additional coefficient selection and the synchronization between the encoder and decoder. Finally, even though the significant component extraction based on the public-based Fisher transform is 0-secure, it raises certain privacy preserving issues. In this paper, we will show that the significant components are collinear to the basis vectors of the Fisher transform. The public information about these basis vectors even with the secret preservation of their signs reveals significant information to the attacker about X. The second setup is based on the binarized data and information about the reliability is completely disregarded thus leading to relatively highP b and sequentially to the reduction of key rate and increase of the privacy leak.
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to design a dataindependent transform for the significant component extraction and reduce the privacy leak due to the helper data. To achieve this goal, we introduce a generic random transform with a fixed number of reliable coefficients and demonstrate the impact of side information accuracy about the significant components onP b in Section 2.1. Based on these results, we propose several authentication schemes with enhanced privacy in Section 2.2. The results of computer simulation are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
In this paper, we will target the key rate maximization approach described in Section I that results in the selection U = X with the upper bound on the key rate R s (7). Therefore, our primary goal is to reduce the privacy leak of both practical systems considered above.
Reliable components extraction
The extraction of significant components in the scope of this paper is performed based on the random projection transform. This transform can also be considered as a mapping of the original data x to some secure and robust domain:
T consists of a set of projection basis vectors w i ∈ R N with 1 ≤ i ≤ L. Instead of following a particular consideration of mapping W, we will assume that W is a random matrix. The matrix W has the elements w i,j that are generated from some specified distribution. L × N random matrix W whose entries w i,j are independent realizations of Gaussian random variables W i,j ∼ N (0, 1 N ) presents a particular interest for our study. In this case, such a matrix can be considered as an almost orthoprojector, for which
WW
T ≈ I L . Moreover, the selection of basis vectors with Gaussian distribution also guarantees the Gaussian distribution of projected coefficients.
The second step also uses a possibly key-dependent labeling or Grey codes to ensure closeness of labels for close vectors. The most simple quantization or binarization of extracted features is known as sign random projections:
where b xi ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 ≤ i ≤ L and sign(a) = 1, if a ≥ 0 and 0, otherwise. The vector b x ∈ {0, 1} L computed for all projections represents a binary template of the vector x. Since all projections are independent, it can be assumed that all bits in b x will be independent and equiprobable.
Obviously, the template computed from some distorted version y of x denoted as b y might contain some bits different from those in b x . Therefore, the link between the binary representation b x of vector x and its noisy counterpart b y of vector y is defined according to the BSC with average probabilityP b . The bit error probability indicates the mismatch of signs betweenx i andỹ i according to (15), i.e., Pr[sign(x i ) = sign(ỹ i )]. For a given x and w i , the probability of bit error is:
or by symmetry as:
For a givenx i and Gaussian noise 1 , the distribution of the projected vector isỸ i ∼ N(x i , σ 
The origin of P b|xi can be explained considering the mutual configuration of x and w i (Fig. 2) . The vector x forms the angle θ XWi with the basis vector w i and the projection results into the scalar valuex i . The closer angle θ XWi is to π/2, the smaller valuex i . This leads to a larger probability that the sign ofỹ i will be different from the sign ofx i . One can immediately note that since the projections are generated at random there is generally no guaranty that two vectors can be collinear. However, at the same time some of the projections might form angles with x that deviate from π/2 thus leading to smaller bit error probability. This observation makes it possible to assume that some projections can be more preferable than others and the equation (18) can be a good measure of bit reliability or significance.
The above analysis only refers to a single realization of x. Since X is a random vector following some distribution p(x), 2 X I N ), the statistics of data in the projection domain areX i ∼ N (0, σ 2 X ) and:
It should be noticed that all possible valuesx i in (19) originating from both "unreliable", i.e., values close to zero, and "reliable", i.e., values far away from zero, projections are taken into account with the same weight to form the resulting binary vector b x . Obviously, for a given set of enrollment data one can always find a set of vectors w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ L minimizing the overall bit error probability like in the case of the Fisher transform. However, keeping in mind the facts that the number of classes might be in the order of millions and constantly updated such an optimization problem looks highly unfeasible. Therefore, in the scope of this paper we will consider another approach when one generates the overcomplete set of random projections J and select among them only those L projections that are the largest in the absolute magnitude, if a fixed number of template bits is requested, or those that are higher then a certain threshold Tx for a given x like in [8] . We will form a vector P x ∈ {0, 1} J containing the positions of significant components marked with 1s. In case of the above thresholding approach, the corresponding average probability of bit error is:
where the multiplier is the normalization constant corresponding to the fraction of distribution behind the threshold.
It is easy to verify that the number of coefficients L of random variableX i following Gaussian distribution and exceeding the threshold Tx in J projections satisfies with high probability the following equation:
where is the necessary number of reliable coefficients (like 32, 64 or 128), F BX (J, , Pr[X i > Tx]) designates binomial cumulative distribution function and Pr[X i > Tx] = Q Tx σX . In the case of selection of L largest components out of J, we will only assume that J is sufficiently large with respect to L to ensure the desirable bit error probabilityP b .
Helper data communication: generalized protocol
The considered extraction of L significant components is used in the generalized authentication protocol shown in Fig. 3 2 . The proposed protocol contains two types of helper data M 1 and M 2 . The helper data M 1 is dedicated to the communication of side information about the significant components P x . The helper data M 2 serves for the errorless key recovery at the decoder based on B y .
Depending on the rate of helper data M 1 , one can design different coding strategies for the desired key rate-privacy trade-off: (a) no side information about the reliable components, i.e., H(P x ) = 0 with the overall helper data privacy leak H 2 (P b ) from M 2 ; (b) the directly compressed significant components index vector P x with the entropy H(P x ) and reduced M 2 leak H 2 (P b ); (c) the vector P x compressed in the distributed way using P y as the noisy side information with the entropy H(P x |P y ) and the same M 2 leak H 2 (P b ). The first strategy corresponds to the direct implementation of the Slepian-Wolf scheme considered in Section 1 with the relatively high privacy leak via M 2 . The second strategy corresponds to the system considered in [8] with the difference in the procedure of significant components extraction described in the previous section. Moreover, contrary to the considered random projections, the publicly known basis vectors of the Fisher transform w j , 1 ≤ j ≤ J enforced by the information about the significant components P xj in [8] can leak up to I(X;
the basis vectors corresponding to the significant components. This mutual information is nonzero and this issue was not addressed in [8] . The third scheme only reveals H(P x |P y ) bits about the positions of significant components contrarily to the previous one. Moreover, we will show in the next section that privacy leak in part of M 2 can be close to zero for a certain operation regime. It should be also pointed out that the use of described keydependent orthoprojector W does not require any training and reveal any information about the basis vectors contrarily to the Fisher transform. Additionally, if the number of future items/users is essentially larger than the cardinality of training set, the performance of random orthoprojector asymptotically 
RESULTS OF COMPUTER SIMULATION
In this section, we present the results of computer simulation for the considered key rate-privacy leak formulation under the Gaussian observation and binarized setup. The observation model is considered in terms of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) defined as SNR = 10 log 10
. All results are obtained for 10000 noise realizations and 100 input vectors. First, we show the impact of significant components extraction onP b according to the proposed overcomplete random projections transform with J = 1500 and L = 32 for N = 1024 length Gaussian input vectors versus the blind ransom transform (19) (Fig. 4) . To estimate the privacy leak due to the distributed coding of helper data M 1 , we performed the simulations shown in Fig. 5 . Obviously, this leak depends on the SNR and asymptotically converges to zero with the SNR increase. The key rate increase due to the usage of significant components versus the blind random projection transform is shown in Fig. 6 . Finally, to investigate the privacy leak due to the helper data M 2 in different protocols, we obtained the results shown in Fig. 7 . The privacy leak due to the significant component selection based on P x is considerably reduced in comparison to the blind scheme. Moreover, one can expect even 0-privacy leak for SNR higher 10 dB.
CONCLUSIONS
We considered the generalized key rate maximizing authentication setup with two types of helper data based on the significant component positions and secure key encoding. The different coding schemes are analyzed to minimize the privacy leak due to the helper data. In particular, we established that one can achieve zero privacy leak in part of significant components helper data by their direct extraction from the noisy data. Moreover, the privacy leak in part of secret key extraction can be significantly reduced thanks to the proposed overcomplete random projection transform with the selection of fixed length template vector. 
